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Grandfathered into Commerce: Assessing the Federal
Reserve’s Proposed Rules Limiting Physical
Commodities Activities of Financial Holding
Companies
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Deepwater Horizon’s oil pipe broke open in the Gulf
of Mexico, millions of people watched the underwater camera showing
BP’s oil pumping into the ocean.1 BP neither owned, nor operated the rig
that exploded and sank after killing eleven people. 2 Still, that oil spill has
gone down in history as the “BP Oil Spill.” 3 BP spent nearly $62 billion
to resolve the legal claims associated with the event and to restore
goodwill and its reputation. 4 But what if instead of the BP Oil Spill, it
had been the Morgan Stanley Oil Spill? 5
Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs are the only two financial
holding companies (“FHCs”) who benefit from a provision of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (“GLBA”), which allows qualifying
FHCs to engage in the extraction and transport of physical commodities. 6
In general, commodities trading by FHCs must be deemed
1. Michael McCarthy, BP Fights to Limit the Slick—And the Damage to its Reputation,
INDEPENDENT (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/bpfights-to-limit-the-slick-ndash-and-the-damage-to-its-reputation-1959598.html.
2. Id. (explaining that Deepwater Horizon was owned and operated by a Swiss drilling
company, Transocean, whereas BP had leased the rig and owned the license to drill in the
seabed).
3. Id.
4. Michael Amon & Tapan Panchal, BP Puts Tab for Gulf Disaster at $62 Billion, WALL
ST. J. (July 14, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bp-estimates-remaining-materialdeepwater-liabilities-1468517684.
5. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., REP. ON WALL STREET BANK
INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODITIES 284 (Comm. Print 2014) (describing a 2006
Morgan Stanley investment in a company that owned approximately 100 oil tankers)
[hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT].
6. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A)-(B) (2016) (outlining the general scope of activities
for financial holding companies, namely activities that are financial in nature or incidental to
such financial activity, as well as complementary to a financial activity); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o)
(2016); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., & OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE C URRENCY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND THE FINANCIAL
STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL PURSUANT TO SECTION 620 OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 16
(2016) [hereinafter SECTION 620 REPORT].
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“complementary to a financial activity” by the Federal Reserve Board
(“Federal Reserve” or “FRB), 7 or fall into a Grandfather Provision
(“Grandfather Provision” or “Grandfather Authority”) that allows two
FHCs—Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs—to continue engaging in a
broader range of nonbanking activities than would otherwise be allowed
under the complementary powers. 8
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”)9 Section 620 called on the federal bank
regulators to study the activities and investments allowed for bank entities
and to examine the risks those activities might create for the safety and
soundness of the American financial system. 10 Over six years later, on
September 8, 2016, the federal bank regulators11 released their “Report
to the Congress and Financial Stability Oversight Council Pursuant to
Section 620 of the Dodd-Frank Act” (“Section 620 Report”). 12 In that
report, the Federal Reserve expressed concerns about FHCs’ ability to
engage in physical commodities activities. 13 The Federal Reserve
recommended Congress repeal this Grandfather Provision. 14
Specifically, the Federal Reserve called on Congress to repeal the
Grandfather Authority that in practice allowed just two FHCs to own
physical commodity assets and infrastructure for commodity storage,
shipment, and use.15
Shortly after releasing the Section 620 Report on September 8,
2016, the Federal Reserve released a notice of proposed rulemaking
(“NPR”) to address the concerns about the risks of commodity activities
by FHCs.16 The September 30, 2016 NPR attempted to limit these

7. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B) (2016); 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii) (2017).
8. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 10.
9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §

620, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2016).
10. Id.; SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
11. The Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the
Office of the Comptroller of Currency.
12. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 1.
13. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 16.
14. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 28.
15. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29–30 (including recommendations from the
Fed, FDIC and OCC. This note covers only the Fed recommendation to repeal the section
4(o) Grandfather activities).
16. Regulations Q and Y; Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory Requirements for
Activities of Financial Holding Companies Related to Physical Commodities and Risk-Based
Capital Requirements for Merchant Banking Investments (“September 2016 Proposed Rule
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commodity activities through stricter capital requirements, activity limits,
and greater required public disclosure of data relating to these activities. 17
Since it would require legislative action to amend this statutory provision,
repealing the Grandfather Provision is outside the scope of the Federal
Reserve’s authority. 18 Therefore, in the NPR the Federal Reserve was
limited to increasing safeguards for physical commodities activities,
which reflect the Federal Reserve’s view of the relative risk of those
activities. 19
Many would argue that all physical commodities activities are
fundamentally riskier than traditional bank activities, and engaging in
these activities undermines the separation of banking and commerce. 20
This raises the question of whether banks should be involved in these
activities at all—an issue the Federal Reserve addressed in its Section 620
Report.21 The Grandfather Provision allows FHCs to engage in a broader
range of activities than permitted under the complementary powers. 22
The activities permitted under the Grandfather Provision—such as
transporting physical commodities through a pipeline or an oil tanker—
are more prone to a catastrophic event than the activities permitted under
the complementary authorities and merchant banking powers, which are
more financial in nature. 23 This Note analyzes separation of banking and
commerce issues that arise out of the FHCs’ authority to engage in
physical commodities trading under the Grandfather Provision and
whether the Federal Reserve is in the best position to address these issues
through a proposed rulemaking or whether it is better left for Congress to
remove the Grandfather Provision altogether.24

on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory Requirements”), 81 Fed. Reg. 67220, 67225
(proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 & 225).
17. Id. (proposing several new restrictions on commodity activities. This Note focuses
on the proposals relating specifically to grandfathered activities.).
18. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 28.
19. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220, 67226–27 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 217 and 225).
20. Id. at 67221.
21. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 28.
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A)–(B), (o) (2016); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 27.
23. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 29.
24. See SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 28 (discussing that recommendations by
the Federal Reserve Board to make statutory changes with regard to special exemptions for
FHCs will require congressional action as the changes cannot be accomplished unilaterally
by the Board).
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This Note proceeds in six parts. Part II examines the current
statutory scheme that allows financial holding companies to engage in
physical commodities activities. 25 Part III lays out a timeline of public
scrutiny of the Grandfather Provision. 26 Part IV discusses the issues
raised by grandfathered activities and assesses whether the FRB’s
proposed rules address those concerns. 27 Part V raises the possibility that
repealing the Grandfather Provision would be unfair to firms who
converted to FHCs under the impression that they could keep those
grandfathered activities as part of their business. 28 Part VI concludes that,
while the FRB’s proposed rules would be a step in the right direction,
Congress should step in and repeal the Grandfather Authority outright. 29
II. CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEME AND REGULATION OF
GRANDFATHERED COMMODITY ACTIVITIES
A.

General Authority for Nonbank Activities

The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (“BHCA”)30 is the
primary statutory authority controlling the activities of companies that
control an insured depository institution. 31 A “principal purpose” of that
Act is to “ensur[e] the separation of banking and commerce.” 32 The
BHCA provides limited ways that a bank holding company (“BHC”) may
permissibly engage in nonbank activities. 33 However, in 1999, GLBA
amended the BHCA and further broadened the range of permissible
activities for a new subset to BHCs that meet certain conditions and are
called FHCs.34
FHCs are permitted to engage in nonbanking activities that are
“financial in nature,”35 while BHCs are restricted to activities “closely
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
12 U.S.C. § 1841, et seq. (2016).
Id.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n) (outlining the authority to retain limited nonfinancial
activities and affiliations); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 1, 3.
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k).
34. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 4–5.
35. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)–(4) (activities that are “financial in nature” include:
underwriting insurance, dealing in securities, etc.).
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related to banking.”36 FHC investments in physical commodities as a
principal are included in those permissible “financial in nature”
activities. 37 There are three grants of authority for a FHC to engage in
physical commodities activities under the BHCA:
(1) the
38
“complementary to a financial activity” provision, (2) the merchant
banking provision, 39 and (3) the Grandfather Provision. 40
The “Complementary to a Financial Activity” Authority

B.

The GLBA allows any FHC to engage in activities that are
“complementary to a financial activity.” 41 A FHC must obtain
permission from the FRB on a case-by-case basis for these activities. 42
The FRB, which has exclusive authority to grant permission, considers
whether the proposed activity is complementary to a financial activity
and whether the activity would “pose a substantial risk to the safety and
soundness of depository institutions or the financial system generally.” 43
In approving these activities, the FRB typically imposes restrictions on
the extent of permitted activity to limit the risk of these activities. 44
FHCs operating under complementary authority are permitted to
buy and sell physical commodities to settle commodities derivatives. 45
They are not permitted to own or operate “facilities for extraction,
transportation, storage, or distribution of commodities.”46 Nor are they
permitted to “process, refine, or otherwise alter commodities.” 47 FHCs
involved in taking and delivering commodities must use reputable third
party companies for storage and transportation of the commodities that
they own.48

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 4.
SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 5, 15.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B).
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H).
12 U.S.C. § 1843(o).
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B); 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii) (2017); SECTION 620
REPORT, supra note 6, at 15.
42. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 15.
43. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 15.
44. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 24.
45. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
46. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
47. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
48. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
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Finally, to keep this line of business from becoming too large, a
FHC’s involvement in physical commodity trading activities is limited to
no more than 5% of the firm’s consolidated Tier 1 capital.49 Essentially,
the complementary authority allows a FHC to own and trade physical
commodities, but does not give the FHC authority to store or transport
those assets in its own facilities. 50
C.

Merchant Banking Authority

The GLBA permits any FHC to make equity investments up to
100% of a commercial firm under the merchant banking authority of the
GLBA. 51 Banks and BHCs may only own up to 5% of the voting shares
in a commercial company.52 This limit is designed to ensure that bank
entities remain passive investors in these commercial companies. 53 PostGLBA, however, the newly created FHCs were granted authority to
purchase and control up to 100% of the voting shares of a commercial
company.54
The statute forbids the FHC from engaging in the routine
management of the company, except as may be necessary to obtain a
reasonable return on investment upon resale. 55 This means that the
investing FHC cannot insert itself into personnel decisions, provide
business advice, or meet with the company’s employees. 56 Essentially,
the FHC must not intertwine itself with the daily activities of the
company.57 However, the FHC is allowed to elect any or all of the board
of directors of a controlled company. 58 These restrictions were put in
place to maintain the separation of banking and commerce. 59

49.
50.
51.
52.

SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (2016).
Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street:
Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 281 (2013).
53. Id.
54. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H).
55. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iv).
56. Omarova, supra note 52, at 283–84.
57. Omarova, supra note 52, at 283–84.
58. 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(d)(1) (2017).
59. Omarova, supra note 52, at 283.

Banking, Commerce, and
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Further, the GLBA restricts the purpose of investment to bona
fide merchant or investment banking activities. 60 In other words, FHCs
may only invest in commercial companies with an eye towards profiting
off the eventual resale of stock in that company. 61 Pursuant to that goal,
the Federal Reserve established caps on the amount of time a FHC is
permitted to hold an investment. 62 Generally, a FHC may hold an
investment for a maximum of ten years, though it may petition the FRB
for an extension.63 These limits are meant to enforce the financial—
rather than commercial—nature of these activities and to limit risk. 64
D.

Powers Specific to the Grandfather Provision

Another route to engaging in nonbanking or nonfinancial
activity—and the focus of this Note—is under Section 4(o) of the GLBA,
the Grandfather Provision.65 This section provides that any firm that was
not a BHC but became a FHC after November 12, 1999—the date of the
GLBA’s enactment—may continue to engage in physical commodities
trading or investment in commodities, even though not permissible for
BHCs, if the firm was engaged in such activities as of September 30, 1997
in the United States.66 The Grandfather Provision effectively permits
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to engage in a broader range of
physical commodity activities than any other authority allowing such
activities. 67
The Section 4(o) Grandfather Provision offers qualifying FHCs
advantages over non-grandfathered FHCs.68 First, the Grandfather
Provision allows a broader range of activities, including transporting,
refining, extracting, and storing physical commodity assets, than would
60. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii).
61. Id.
62. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.172 (mandating the period of time FHCs are generally permitted

to hold merchant banking investments).
63. 12 C.F.R. § 225.172(b)(1); 12 C.F.R. § 225.172(b)(4)–(5).
64. Omarova, supra note 52, at 283.
65. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o) (“[A] financial holding company . . . may continue to engage
in . . . activities related to the trading, sale, or investment in commodities . . . .”).
66. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG.,
WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF SAULE T. OMAROVA, PROFESSOR OF LAW, CORNELL UNIVERSITY 10
(Comm. Print 2014).
67. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o) (providing for the Grandfather Authority of certain financial
holding companies); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o).
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be allowed under the complementary powers. 69 Second, the Grandfather
Provision does not require the FHC to ask permission from the FRB for
those activities.70 Third, the Grandfather Provision is subject to less
restrictive aggregate investment limits than the complementary
authority. 71
Activities under the Grandfather Provision are not vetted by the
72
FRB. Unlike complementary physical commodities activities, which
require explicit permission from the FRB, 73 the Section 4(o) Grandfather
Authority is automatic and a FHC is not required to seek permission from
or notify the FRB of new activities. 74 The GLBA grants permission to
any company who becomes a FHC after November 12, 1999, to “continue
to engage in . . . activities related to the trading, sale, or investment in
commodities and underlying physical properties,” 75 so long as the
company, “or any subsidiary of the holding company, lawfully was
engaged, directly or indirectly, in any of such activities as of September
30, 1997, in the United States.”76 There are two possible interpretations
of this clause.77 The first interpretation is that a qualifying FHC may
continue to perform only the activities that it legally engaged in prior to
the grandfather date in 1997.78 The second interpretation takes the view
that the statute should be read expansively, so that if a FHC’s predecessor
or subsidiary was engaged in any physical commodity activity prior to
the 1997 grandfather date, then the FHC is permitted to continue those
activities and add new activities at any time, subject only to the 5%

69. Id.; SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 15–16.
70. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o); see SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 16 (stating that a

company that was not a BHC and becomes an FHC after November 12, 1999, may
automatically continue to engage in activities related to commodities, implying that no
permission is needed from the FRB).
71. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 30.
72. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 30.
73. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(2)(A) (“In connection with a notice under this subsection, the
Board shall consider whether performance of the activity by a bank holding company or a
subsidiary of such company can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public,
such as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh
possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair
competition, conflicts of interests, unsound banking practices, or risk to the stability of the
United States banking or financial system.”).
74. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 30.
75. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o).
76. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o)(1).
77. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 58.
78. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 58.
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activity cap in the statute.79 The Federal Reserve, the agency responsible
for administering the BHCA, which this provision of the GLBA
amended, has not taken a position on this question. 80
The legislative history of the GLBA tends to support the first,
more restrictive interpretation of the grandfather clause. 81 Senator Phil
Gramm explained that the purpose of this amendment was to ensure that
a securities firm that might become a FHC following GLBA would not
be forced to divest parts of its business. 82 Further, the statutory language
reads that the provision “‘grandfathers’ existing commodities
activities.”83 The Senate Banking Committee report on the bill gives no
indication that the Grandfather Provision is meant to authorize new
activities. 84 Further, the phrase “grandfather clause” is defined in Black’s
Law Dictionary as a “provision that creates an exemption from the law’s
effect for something that existed before the law’s effective date.” 85 This
tends to support a narrow interpretation of the statute to include only
those specific activities that the firm was engaged in as of September 30,
1997.86

79. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 58.
80. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 58.
81. See Amendment #9 Gramm Amendment on Grandfathering Existing Commodities

Activities, 106th Cong. (1999),
http://banking.senate.gov/docs/reports/fsmod99/gramm9.htm (showing the legislative history
of the GLBA and that Senator Phil Gramm’s amendment enlarges the Act’s grandfather
provisions); COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 58.
82. Amendment #9 Gramm Amendment on Grandfathering Existing Commodities
Activities, 106th Cong. (1999),
http://banking.senate.gov/docs/reports/fsmod99/gramm9.htm (“The above amendment
assures that a securities firm currently engaged in a broad range of commodities activities as
part of its traditional investment banking activities, is not required to divest certain aspects of
its business in order to participate in the new authorities granted under the Financial Services
Modernization Act. This provision “grandfathers” existing commodities activities.”).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-127, pt. 1, at 97 (1995) (“The Committee intends that activities
relating to the trading, sale or investment in commodities and underlying physical properties
shall be construed broadly and shall include owning and operating properties and facilities
required to extract, process, store and transport commodities.”); COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 59.
85. Grandfather Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A provision that
creates an exemption from the law’s effect for something that existed before the law’s
effective date; specif., a statutory or regulatory clause that exempts a class of persons or
transactions because of circumstances existing before the new rule or regulation takes
effect.”).
86. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o)(1) (2016) (authorizing an FHC to continue engaging in
commodity activities which it was engaging in prior to September 30, 1997).
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Qualifying FHCs, however, have argued for a more expansive
interpretation of the grandfather authority that allows the FHCs to engage
in any physical commodity activity, even new activities. 87 In its 2008
application to become a BHC, Goldman Sachs wrote:
The Section 4(o) exemption does not require that a
company have been engaged prior to September 30, 1997
in all the activities that it seeks to grandfather under
Section 4(o) at the time the company becomes a BHC
[Bank Holding Company], rather it only requires that the
company have been engaged prior to that date in
commodity-related activities that were not permissible
for a BHC in the United States on that date. 88
This self-serving interpretation allows Goldman Sachs to engage
in any new commodity activities that it wants—without requiring
permission or notification of the FRB—so long as it was engaged in some
physical commodity activity prior to the grandfather date in 1997. 89
Goldman Sachs argued in a letter to the Federal Reserve that the proposed
capital increases would “pre-empt Congressional authority by taking
action in direct contravention to the language of Section 4(o).” 90 Without
citing any statutory authority, Goldman Sachs claims that Congress
passed the Grandfather Provision because of the expertise and risk

87. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 60.
88. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 60 (quoting “Confidential Application to the

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and
Goldman Sachs Bank USA Holdings LLC,” prepared by Goldman Sachs, FRB-PSI-303638 662, at 648–649, 661).
89. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 60
90. Letter from John F.W. Rogers on Behalf of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., to
Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 3–4 (Feb. 21, 2017).
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management provided by FHCs in the commodities industry. 91 Morgan
Stanley, the other qualifying FHC, has endorsed a similar interpretation. 92
While the statute restricts these grandfathered activities to
comprising no more than 5% of a FHC’s total consolidated assets, it is
unclear how strict that limit is. 93 The statutory 5% cap could be
interpreted as “capping only those physical commodity assets for which
a qualifying FHC cannot find an alternative authorization, either under its
merchant banking or ‘complementary’ powers.” 94 This means that, if the
FHC is able to present a commodity activity as authorized under its
merchant banking or complementary powers, the FHC could perhaps
have the commodities portion of its assets exceed the 5% of total
consolidated assets limit.95 The current statutory structure is ambiguous
and has allowed these two FHCs to engage in expansive commodities
activities. 96
III. TIMELINE OF SCRUTINY OF COMMODITY ACTIVITIES
After the passage of the GLBA, no firm immediately took
advantage of the Grandfather Provision. Investment banks continued to
engage in physical commodity activities outside the supervisory authority

91. Id. at 4 (“In enacting Section 4(o), Congress explicitly acknowledged the importance
of the expertise and risk management provided by FHC intermediaries in the physical
commodities markets.”). In fact, the legislative history of the GLBA shows that the
Grandfather Provision was included so that FHCs would not have to divest parts of their
business in its conversion to an FHC. See Amendment #9 Gramm Amendment on
Grandfathering Existing Commodities Activities, 106th Cong. (1999),
http://banking.senate.gov/docs/reports/fsmod99/gramm9.htm (providing that FHCs cannot
continue to engage in activities related to trading in commodities unless the holding company
is predominantly engaged in financial activities).
92. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 60 (“[T]he plain language of Section 4(o)
authorizes a qualifying financial holding company to continue to engage in any activities
related to trading, selling, and investing in any type of commodities and related physical
properties or facilities, if certain conditions are satisfied. Section 4(o) does not merely
authorize the retention of investments in commodities or related physical properties or
facilities made or held on a certain date. Instead, it expressly extends to the continuation of
any activities related to the trading, selling, and investing in any type of commodities and
related properties or facilities, if certain conditions are satisfied.”) (emphasis in original).
93. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o) (2016); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 1, 16.
94. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG.,
WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF SAULE T. OMAROVA, PROFESSOR OF LAW, CORNELL UNIVERSITY 10
(Comm. Print 2014).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 11.
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of the Federal Reserve. 97 It was not until the 2008 financial crisis when
some of these investment banks that were involved in physical
commodity activity converted to FHCs—to become eligible for bailout
money from the government 98—that they came under the regulatory
authority of the Federal Reserve. 99 In response to this new influx of
potentially risky activities, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
created a “Commodities Team” that initiated a two-year investigation
into the commodities activities of the ten largest banks under FRB
supervision. 100
In 2011, the issue of FHC involvement began to seep into the
mainstream with a widely publicized report of Goldman Sachs hoarding
12% of the world’s aluminum in a warehouse to artificially inflate
prices.101 Coca-Cola filed a complaint with the London Metal Exchange
about this practice, as aluminum prices hit record highs.102 Professor
Saule T. Omarova referenced that incident with Goldman in her 2013
Minnesota Law Review piece that took an unprecedented look at the
extent of physical commodities activities by U.S. banking
organizations.103 Professor Omarova was called to testify at a November
2014 Senate Subcommittee hearing on “Wall Street Bank Involvement in

97. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., REP. ON WALL STREET BANK
INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODITIES 60 (Comm. Print 2014).
98. Kristin Jones, Why Is Everyone Becoming a Bank Holding Company? It’s All About
the Benjamins, PROPUBLICA, (Nov. 12, 2008), https://www.propublica.org/article/why-iseveryone-becoming-a-bank-holding-company-1112 (listing eligibility for TARP funding and
access to Fed Discount window as key reasons for change); Michael J. de la Merced, et al.,
As Goldman and Morgan Shift, a Wall St. Era Ends, DEALBOOK: N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2008),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/goldman-morgan-to-become-bank-holdingcompanies (discussing the rationale behind Goldman Sachs’ and Morgan Stanley’s shift to
holding companies, such as the ability to combine investment-banking operations with larger
capital cushions).
99. Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Board Approves,
Pending a Statutory Five-Day Antitrust Waiting Period, the Applications of Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley to Become Bank Holding Companies (Sept. 21, 2008) https://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20080921a.htm;
COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 5, at 50.
100. Comment Letter from Elise J. Bean & Tyler E. Gellasch to Robert deV. Frierson,
Sec’y, Fed. Reserve Sys. Bd. of Governors (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
SECRS/2017/May/20170518/R-1547/R-1547_122216_131639_432161420310_1.pdf.
101. Dustin Walsh, Aluminum Bottleneck: Coke’s complaint: 12% of Global Stockpile
Held Here, Boosting Prices, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Jun. 26, 2011), http://
www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20110626/FREE/306269994/aluminum.
102. Id.
103. Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and
Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 266–68 (2013).
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Physical Commodities,” along with the heads of Goldman Sachs, Morgan
Stanley, and JP Morgan Chase. 104 The subcommittee issued a report
authored by Senators Levin and McCain on the extent of FHC physical
commodity activities and the potential liability those activities created for
FHCs.105 The subcommittee recommended narrowing the scope of
permissible commodities activities, strictly enforcing the size limits
imposed by the grandfather clause, and clarifying the scope of the
grandfather clause to only permit FHCs to continue engaging in activities
in which they had already been engaging before the grandfather date. 106
Professor Omarova’s work attracted attention from popular
media outlets. 107 The Daily Show picked up the Goldman Sachs
aluminum hoarding story and showed a clip of Professor Omarova’s
testimony on the program.108
In this environment of public scrutiny, the Federal Reserve issued
a September 2016 report pursuant to Section 620 of the Dodd-Frank Act
in which the FRB recommended repeal of the Grandfather Authority. 109
That report was quickly followed by a notice of proposed rulemaking. 110
The comments were originally due in December 2016.111 After the 2016
presidential election, the Federal Reserve announced that it would allow
firms an extension on the comment letter deadline, due to the complexity
of the issues presented. 112 The extended due date for comments was
February 20, 2018.113

104. Hearing on Wall Street Bank Involvement With Physical Commodities before the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 113th Cong. (2014).
105. Staff of S. Comm. on Investigations, 113th Cong., Rep. on Wall Street Bank
Involvement with Physical Commodities 1 (2014).
106. Id. at 9–12.
107. Omarova Article Puts Questionable Banking Practices in National Spotlight, UNC
SCHOOL OF LAW (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.law.unc.edu/news/story.aspx?cid=844.
108. Brent Lang, John Oliver: Did J.P. Morgan Just Get the Idea to Go Into Sex
Trafficking?, THE WRAP (Oct. 30, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.thewrap.com/john-oliverdid-jp-morgan-just-get-idea-go-sex-trafficking-106186/.
109. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29.
110. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Pt.
217 & 225).
111. Id.
112. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Board
extends comment period to February 20, 2017, on proposed rule that would strengthen
existing requirements and limitations on the physical commodity activities of financial
holding companies (Dec. 20, 2016) (on file with author).
113. Id.
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IV. PHYSICAL COMMODITY ACTIVITIES UNDER THE GRANDFATHER
PROVISION
The FHCs have a “significant footprint” in physical commodities
markets.114 Morgan Stanley has an oil storage capacity of 58 million
barrels and eighteen natural gas storage facilities in the United States and
Europe.115 In 2009, Morgan Stanley was the ninth largest oil shipping
distillate in the world, operating more than 100 ships for oil transport.116
Goldman Sachs purchased a Colombian coal mine for $204 million. 117
With such expansive physical operations, it is no wonder that the Federal
Reserve has raised concerns about FHC liability in the event of a
catastrophic environmental event.118
Permitting FHCs to engage directly in a broader range of
commercial activities, such as physical commodities activities, cuts
against the principle of separating banking and commerce. 119 This
section assesses the three concerns that the FRB cited in making this
recommendation: (1) safety and soundness, (2) competitive issues
presented by the Grandfather Provision, and (3) the potential for conflict
of interest.
A.

Safety and Soundness

Section 4(o) does not prohibit FHCs from owning and operating
the infrastructure necessary for physical commodities activities. 120 This
power creates safety and soundness concerns because some federal
environmental laws impose strict liability on the owners and operators of
facilities whose pollution causes damages. 121 Both Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs acknowledge the risks that stem from their involvement
in physical commodities activities in the Risk Factors section of their
114. Staff of S. Comm. on Investigations, 113th Cong., Rep. on Wall Street Bank
Involvement with Physical Commodities 81 (2014).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 82.
117. Id.
118. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 27.
119. Id. at 30.
120. 12 U.S.C. 1843(o) (2016); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29.
121. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29; see e.g., 33 U.S.C. 1321, 2701–02(f)(1)
(2016) (holding the owner and operator of a facility or vessel that discharges oil to be strictly
liable).
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annual 10-K report to the Securities and Exchange Commission. 122 The
liability for an environmental catastrophe creates financial and
reputational risk for FHCs beyond the scope of the risks presented by
traditional bank activities.123 As owners and investors in physical
facilities for the storage and transport of commodities, FHCs exercising
Section 4(o) authority open themselves up to liability for environmental
catastrophes. 124
In addition, commodities activity that ends in
catastrophe could damage public confidence in the financial
institution.125
If a catastrophic environmental event occurred in the course of
this physical commodities activity, the FHC could incur losses that
“greatly exceed the firm’s investments in the physical assets, the market
value of the physical commodities involved in the catastrophic event,
committed capital, and insurance policies of the organization.” 126 Many
federal and state environmental laws impose strict liability on the owners
and operators of infrastructure for the transport of certain physical
commodities.127
122. Morgan Stanley, Form 10-K Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 of 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 18–19 (Dec. 31, 2016) https://www.morganstanley.com/
about-us-ir/pdf/MS_10K_December_31_2016.pdf (“Our commodities activities and
investments subject us to extensive regulation, and environmental risks and regulation that
may expose us to significant costs and liabilities.”); The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Form
10-K Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 of 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
39 (Dec. 31, 2016) http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/financials/current/10k/
2016-10-k.pdf (“We face enhanced risks . . . in a number of our businesses, including where
we make markets, invest and lend, we directly or indirectly own interests in, or otherwise
become affiliated with the ownership and operation of public services, such as airports, toll
roads and shipping ports, as well as physical commodities and commodities infrastructure
components, both within and outside the U.S.”).
123. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29.
124. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29.
125. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29.
126. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 27; Complementary Activities, Merchant
Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies Related to Physical
Commodities, 79 Fed. Reg. 3329 (proposed Jan. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Chapter
II).
127. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Pt.
217 & 225) (“Certain federal environmental laws, including the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA), and the Clean Water Act (CWA), generally impose liability on owners and
operators of facilities and vessels for the release of physical commodities, such as oil, distillate
fuel oil, jet fuel, liquefied petroleum gas, gasoline, fertilizer, natural gas, and propylene.
Consequently, a company that directly owns an oil tanker or petroleum refinery that releases
crude oil in a navigable waterway or adjoining shoreline in the United States may be liable
for removal costs and damages for that release under the OPA.”)
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This concern was raised by the FRB in light of recent catastrophic
environmental events, like the oil spill involving the Deepwater Horizon,
which accounted for cumulative losses at BP of $53.8 billion as of
2015.128 BP paid approximately $4.5 billion to resolve federal criminal
claims and federal securities law claims related to the spill. Civil
litigation is also ongoing, as the parties are unable to determine the full
economic impact of the event.129 The FRB argues that the costs of
preventing accidents like these are high and the costs of liability related
to physical commodities activities can be difficult to limit and higher than
expected. 130
Banks argue, however, that environmental liability can be
avoided if appropriate safeguards are undertaken. 131 Goldman Sachs
describes its involvement in commodities as providing “commodity
intermediation” services.132 Goldman Sachs claims that a bank entity
engaging in commodity intermediation can preclude liability by putting
in place safeguards designed “to prevent an owner of commodities from
assuming the status of ‘operator’ of facilities in which commodities are
stored, transported, or processed.” 133 Though Goldman Sachs has
publicly claimed it is shielded from liability as an operator, the firm has
purchased “contingent, third-party environmental/pollution liability
coverage” insurance. 134
Goldman Sachs’ position is that these
commodities activities present similar market risks to its financial
products like loans or bonds whose risk can be managed and mitigated. 135

128. Susan Heavey, Patrick Rucker, Emily Stephenson, U.S. Says BP to Pay $20 Billion
in Fines for 2010 Oil Spill, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2015, 7:46 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-bp-usa/u-s-says-bp-to-pay-20-billion-in-fines-for-2010-oil-spillidUSKCN0RZ14A20151005.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Letter from John F.W. Rogers on behalf of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., to Robert
deV. Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 4 (Apr. 16, 2014).
132. Id.
133. Id. (“Even with respect to environmentally sensitive commodities, an FHC engaged
in intermediation will not be subject to liability under well-settled environmental law by
adhering to straight-forward policies and procedures designed to prevent an owner of
commodities from assuming the status of ‘operator’ of facilities in which commodities are
stored, transported or processed.”)
134. Staff of S. Comm. on Investigations, 113th Cong., Rep. on Wall Street Bank
Involvement with Physical Commodities 134 (2014).
135. Letter from John F.W. Rogers on behalf of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., to Robert
deV. Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 3 (Apr. 16, 2014).
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The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(“SIFMA”), a securities industry trade group, wrote in a comment letter
to the FRB (“SIFMA Letter”) that FHCs engaged in Section 4(o)
commodities business are practicing safe and sound banking so long as
those activities are subjected to “appropriate safeguards.”136
Environmental liability typically attaches to the owner and operator of
the facility where the catastrophe occurred. 137 Section 4(o) authority
allows FHCs to own and operate facilities that process, store, and

136. Letter from Kenneth E. Bensten, Jr. et al. on behalf of SIFMA, to Robert deV.
Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 57 (Apr. 16, 2014) (“We do not
believe that engaging in Environmentally Sensitive Commodities Handling Activities as a
Grandfathered Commodities Activity or making merchant banking investments in portfolio
companies engaged in such activities would amount to an unsafe or unsound practice or
otherwise be justified, if conducted or made subject to appropriate safeguards when
appropriate, such as those described in Appendix C.”); Letter from Kenneth E. Bensten, Jr. et
al. on behalf of SIFMA, to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 57 (Apr. 16, 2014), app. at C-1, Practices for Limiting Environmental Liability and
Ensuring that Legal Entity Separateness Will Be Respected (giving a sample procedure that,
if followed, would shield a bank from liability for its commodities activities.).
137. Whether FHCs can be held liable as owners/operators of a facility that is part of an
environmental catastrophe is outside the scope of this Note. For a more complete discussion
of potential liability, see Letter from Kenneth E. Bensten, Jr. et al. on behalf of SIFMA, to
Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 54 (Apr. 16, 2014)
(“Under these laws, the parties responsible for damages resulting from the release of an
environmentally sensitive commodity include the owner and operator of the facility from
which the release occurred, as well as parties that directly handle the commodity or arrange
for its treatment or disposal. Liability typically does not attach to an entity that merely owns
a commodity that is released, or that enters into ordinary course contracts for transportation
or storage. Nor does liability typically attach to an entity that merely invests in a business
that is engaged in the activity that gives rise to the release.”); see also Letter from Kenneth E.
Bensten, Jr. et al. on behalf of SIFMA, to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys. 57 (Apr. 16, 2014), app. at B-4, Joint Memorandum of Law (“Trading
or investing in physical commodities, including environmentally sensitive commodities, or
engaging in related activities such as extraction, generation, transportation, storage, or
processing, may, in certain circumstances, give rise to liability for damages resulting from the
release of environmentally sensitive commodities.”).
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transport physical commodities.138 Despite this, FHCs using this
authority say they can effectively manage the investment’s risk. 139
The FRB’s proposed rule addresses safety and soundness
concerns by increasing the required amount of risk-based capital to reflect
the increased risk associated with Section 4(o) commodity activities. 140
Specifically, the FRB proposed a 1,250% risk weight—the highest risk
weight it can assign—on all commodities assets owned under the Section
4(o) authority. 141
Some observers speculate that by imposing these new capital
requirements the Federal Reserve intends to preclude FHCs from
engaging in these Section 4(o) activities altogether. 142 The proposed rule
requires banks to keep one dollar of capital for every dollar invested in
physical commodities under the Grandfather Authority. 143 The FRB’s

138. 12 U.S.C. 1843(o) (2016); see e.g., Staff of S. Comm. on Investigations, 113th Cong.,
Rep. on Wall Street Bank Involvement with Physical Commodities 295 (2014) (“Morgan
Stanley has been participating in physical jet fuel activities since at least 2003. Since then it
has stored and transported millions of barrels of jet fuel per year, while participating in
financial transactions to hedge volatile jet fuel costs. Over a ten-year period from 2003 to
2013, Morgan Stanley became the primary jet fuel supplier for United Airlines.); see e.g.,
Staff of S. Comm. on Investigations, 113th Cong., Rep. on Wall Street Bank Involvement
with Physical Commodities 146–47 (2014) (“While Goldman has traded coal in financial and
physical markets for years, Goldman fundamentally expanded its physical coal activities by
purchasing an open pit coal mine in Colombia in 2010, and a neighboring open pit coal mine
in 2012. Goldman formed a number of Colombian entities to function as the mine owners,
including CNR, while its primary commodities trading arm, J. Aron & Co., became the mines’
exclusive coal marketing and sales agent.”).
139. Letter from John F.W. Rogers on behalf of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., to t deV.
Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 1 (Apr. 16, 2014).
140. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220, 67225 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. Pt. 217 and 225).
141. Id. at 67227.
142. Comment Letter from Carter McDowell & Richard Coffman to Robert deV. Frierson,
Sec’y, Fed. Reserve Sys. Bd. of Governors 5 (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
SECRS/2017/April/20170414/R-1547/R-1547_021717_131733_608227617620_1.pdf (“If
implemented, the Proposed Rule inevitably would force domestic FHCs and the U.S.
subsidiaries of foreign FHCs to significantly reduce or even terminate their commodities
activities, causing adverse effects on competition, end users, the liquidity of commodities
markets, small and medium-sized companies in the commodities sector, and thus the real
economy.”).
143. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, PHYSICAL COMMODITY ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED BY
FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES 2 (2016), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/
SC_Publication_Physical_Commodity_Activities_Conducted_by_Financial_Holding_Comp
anies.pdf; September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220, 67227–28 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. Pt. 217 & 225) (imposing a 300% risk weight on merchant banking and commodity
activities complementary to a financial activity.).
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impact analysis of these rules found that the required amount of capital
for all commodities activities in the aggregate across the industry,
including Section 4(o) and other authorities, could increase by as much
as $34 billion. 144
The FRB claims that these new capital requirements capture the
risk of a potential environmental catastrophe without making Section 4(o)
activities “prohibitively costly.”145 These increased capital requirements
would not disrupt the industry, the FRB says, because the estimated
increase in risk-weighted assets would be only 0.7%.146 Further, the new
capital requirements are “not intended to require capital against the full
amount of legal liability and reputational harm that might result from a
catastrophic event.”147 The potential costs of a commodity discharge
include legal liability as well as potential reputational harm, which is
difficult to predict and quantify. 148
The Federal Reserve has explicitly recommended to Congress
that the Section 4(o) authority be repealed, so some observers have
claimed that these new requirements are designed to make Section 4(o)
activities impracticable. 149 It remains to be seen if these capital
requirements will price FHCs out of this business altogether. 150 If FHCs
continue their Section 4(o) commodity activities, having extra capital to
insure against potential losses could help offset losses in the event of an
environmental catastrophe and keep the FHC solvent. 151 On the other
hand, ceasing these activities altogether may be the safest and soundest

144. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220, 67229 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. Pt. 217 & 225).
145. Id. at 67227.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 143, at 1; SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note
6, at 28 (recommending that Congress repeal the grandfather authority FHCs use to engage in
commodities activities); but see September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and
Other Regulatory Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220, 67227 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. Pt. 217 & 225) (“Rather, the risk weight is intended to reflect the higher
risks of physical commodity activities permissible only under section 4(o) grandfather
authority without also making the activities prohibitively costly by attempting to capture the
risks of the largest environmental catastrophes.”).
150. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 143, at 1.
151. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220, 67227 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. Pt. 217 & 225).
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practice for FHCs, given the potential for huge liability. 152 Even if FHCs
take steps to avoid liability by refraining from owning or operating
commodity infrastructure,153 the fact remains that the law allows FHCs
to be the owners and operators of commodity infrastructure like transport,
storage, and distribution facilities. 154 Those activities present the greatest
risk of liability and FHCs would still be permitted to engage in those
activities, even if the proposed rules are enacted. 155 The FRB took the
most drastic action it could to reduce or eliminate these activities, given
that those activities are protected by statute.156 Congress will need to step
in and repeal the statutory authority to fully address the safety and
soundness issues raised by these Section 4(o) activities. 157
B.

Anti-Competitive Concerns

Only Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are authorized to use
the Grandfather Provision to engage in physical commodities
activities. 158 This authority provides three key advantages for these
FHCs: (1) these FHCs are privy to insider information that gives those
firms advantages in commodities activities that are unavailable for other
firms, 159 (2) the Section 4(o) commodities activities are subject to a less
restrictive activity limit than their non-grandfathered counterparts, and
152. Id. at 67221–22.
153. Letter from Kenneth E. Bensten, Jr. et al. on behalf of SIFMA, to Robert deV.

Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 57 (Apr. 16, 2014) (“We do not
believe that engaging in Environmentally Sensitive Commodities Handling Activities as a
Grandfathered Commodities Activity or making merchant banking investments in portfolio
companies engaged in such activities would amount to an unsafe or unsound practice or
otherwise be justified, if conducted or made subject to appropriate safeguards when
appropriate, such as those described in Appendix C.”); Letter from Kenneth E. Bensten, Jr. et
al. on behalf of SIFMA, to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys. 57 (Apr. 16, 2014), app. at C-1, Practices for Limiting Environmental Liability
and Ensuring that Legal Entity Separateness Will Be Respected (giving a sample procedure
that, if followed, would shield a bank from liability for its commodities activities.).
154. 12 U.S.C. 1843(o) (2016); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 16 (“Specifically,
section 4(o) may permit a qualifying FHC to own, operate, or invest in facilities for the
extraction, transportation, storage, or distribution of commodities, or to process or refine
commodities.”).
155. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220, 67225 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. Pt. 217 & 225).
156. Id.
157. 12 U.S.C. 1843(o); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 28.
158. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29.
159. See infra I.B.1.
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(3) grandfathered firms do not need to seek the FRB’s permission before
beginning a new activity. 160
The first advantage involves superior information; when a FHC
is engaged in the mining, shipping, and storing of physical commodities,
it is privy to information that is unavailable to its non-FHC competitors
who are not allowed to engage in these activities.161 Unlike the securities
trading market, U.S. commodities trading laws do not restrict the use of
non-public information. 162 Examples of useful, non-public information
include: information about industry price trends, upcoming large
transactions, supply disruptions, and regulatory actions. 163 Banks and
regulators acknowledge this advantage. In a 2005 application to the FRB
for expanded commodities activities under the complementary authority,
JPMorgan Chase suggested that “the information gathered through this
increased market participation [in physical commodities] will help
improve projections of forward and financial activity and supply vital
price and risk management information that JPMorgan Chase can use to
improve its financial commodities derivative offerings.”164 This
advantage could be even greater for a FHC that actually owns and
operates commodities infrastructure. 165 For example, consider a FHC
that controls an oil refinery. 166 If the refinery were to experience
technical trouble that would affect supply, the controlling FHC would be
the first to know. 167 The FHC could use that information to short oil
prices, resulting in predictable gains. 168 This insider information gives
the FHC an undeniable informational advantage in commodities
trading. 169
FHCs also have a capitalization advantage over non-FHC
competitors who do not have access to the Federal Reserve’s Discount

160. See infra I.B.2.
161. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29.
162. Staff of S. Comm. on Investigations, 113th Cong., Rep. on Wall Street Bank

Involvement with Physical Commodities 35 (2014).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 36.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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Window. 170 The Discount Window is the lender of last resort for banks
and BHCs and is available to relieve liquidity strains and as a backup
source of funding for banks and BHCs to meet their reserve
requirements. 171 Any bank or BHC that is required to hold reserves at the
Federal Reserve is eligible for the FRB’s Discount Window lending; nonbank commercial firms are not permitted to borrow from the Discount
Window. 172 Though it is uncommon for FHCs to actually take advantage
of the Discount Window,173 the possibility of cheap, easy to access, and
federally subsidized credit is unavailable to the non-FHC competitors in
the commodities marketplace.174 This access to funds creates a
significant advantage for FHCs who are, under Section 4(o) authority,
acting as direct competitors to traditional, commercial commodities
firms. 175
Amongst FHCs, those firms with Section 4(o) authority have a
more lenient commodities activity limit than commodities activities
conducted by FHCs under other authorities. 176 Commodities activities
conducted under the Section 4(o) authority can make up no more than 5%
of the FHC’s total consolidated assets. 177 While this limit is designed as
a “brake” on the purely commercial activities of FHCs, the practical
effect of the limit is unclear.178 First, 5% of the total consolidated assets
for a large FHC like Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley is no drop in the

170. 12 U.S.C. § 347b (2016) (outlining the scenarios when the Federal Reserve is
permitted to make an advance to member banks through its Discount Window).
171. Discount Window Lending, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Sept. 29,
2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/discount-window.htm.
172. 12 C.F.R. § 204.1(c) (2017); Eligibility to Borrow, FED. RESERVE DISCOUNT WINDOW
(June 22, 2015), https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/en/Pages/General-Information/TheDiscount-Window.aspx#eligibility.
173. OLIVIER ARMANTIER ET AL., DISCOUNT WINDOW STIGMA DURING THE 2007-2008
FINANCIAL CRISIS, 1–6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y, Staff Reports) (2015), https://
www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr483.pdf (Listing the two
primary reasons for member banks to avoid using the Discount Window as (1) a higher
interest rate than other available sources of funding, and (2) a perception that taking advantage
of the Discount Window is a sign of institutional weakness and instability.).
174. Comment Letter from Dennis M. Kelleher to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y, Fed.
Reserve Sys. Bd. of Governors 10–11 (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
SECRS/2017/May/20170526/R-1547/R-1547_021717_131726_589907666303_1.pdf.
175. Id.
176. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o)(2) (2016).
177. Id.
178. Written Testimony of Saule T. Omarova, Professor of Law, Cornell University,
before the Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 10 (Nov. 21, 2014).
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bucket; indeed, with trillion dollar balance sheets, qualifying FHCs have
a wide breadth to engage in commodities activities. 179 Compare that with
the limit on complementary commodities activities, which can make up
no more than 5% of the FHC’s Tier 1 capital.180 Take, for example,
Goldman Sach’s balance sheet. 181 As of June 30, 2017, Goldman Sachs
reported just under $907 billion in total assets. 182 With a 5% of total
consolidated assets limit on activity, Goldman is able to engage in Section
4(o) activities worth up to $45.4 billion. 183 On the flip side, Goldman’s
total Tier 1 capital totals just over $23 billion. 184 Under complementary
authority, which limits commodities activities to no more than 5% of Tier
1 capital, Goldman would be limited to $1.2 billion. 185 A FHC of
Goldman’s size is therefore allowed to engage in commodities activities
worth up to 97.4% more than their counterparts who were not
grandfathered into this authority. 186
The proposed rules do not address the information advantage that
grandfathered FHCs have. 187 Further, the plain language of the statute
forbids the FRB from creating tighter activity caps.188 The proposed rules
do not create a requirement for FHCs to notify the FRB about new

179. Id.
180. 12 U.S.C. 1843(k)(1)(B); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 30.
181. Holding Companies with Assets Greater Than $10 Billion, NAT’L INFO. CTR. (June

30, 2017) [hereinafter NAT’L INFO. CTR.], https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/
HCSGreaterThan10B.aspx.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. GOLDMAN SACHS BANK USA AND SUBSIDIARIES, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR
ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2015 124 (2015), http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/
financials/current/subsidiary-financial-info/gsbank-usa/gs-bank-usa-2015-financialstatements.pdf.
185. Id.
186. NAT’L INFO. C TR., supra note 181.
187. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Pt.
217 & 225).
188. 12 U.S.C. 1843(o)(2) (2016) (“[T]he attributed aggregate consolidated assets of the
company held by the holding company pursuant to this subsection, and not otherwise
permitted to be held by a financial holding company, are equal to not more than 5% of the
total consolidated assets of the bank holding company, except that the Board may increase
that percentage by such amounts and under such circumstances as the Board considers
appropriate, consistent with the purposes of this Act.”) (emphasis added).
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activities, nor do the proposed rules create a requirement for permission
for those activities.189
C.

Conflict of Interest Concerns

One public policy consideration in favor of separation of banking
and commerce is the importance of an objective banking system that
allocates credit in an equitable way. 190 In other words, involvement in
commercial activities—whether by a bank or a FHC subsidiary—creates
a potential conflict of interest when it comes to lending to competitors in
that commercial market. 191 Finding reliable data about lending practices
in the face of a conflict of interest is difficult, but there is certainly a
temptation for self-serving lending practices and other abuse by FHCs. 192
Consider that in 2011, the Coca-Cola Company filed a complaint
with the London Metal Exchange that accused Goldman Sachs of
hoarding aluminum to artificially raise the market price. 193 Metro
International Trade Services LLC (“Metro International”) was a metal
warehousing company in Detroit, wholly owned by Goldman Sachs. 194
At the time of the accusation, Metro International held over 12% of the
warehoused aluminum in the world. 195 Metro International’s inventory
of aluminum went up from 893,025 tons of aluminum in February 2010
to 1.15 million tons as of June 22, 2011. 196 Goldman Sachs purchased

189. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Pt.
217 & 225).
190. 12 U.S.C. 1843(k)(1)(B) (2016); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 30.
191. Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and
Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 346–47 (2013) (“One of the key policy reasons for
separating banking from commerce is the fear of banks unfairly restricting their commercialmarket competitors’ access to credit, the lifeblood of the economy.”).
192. Id.
193. Dustin Walsh, Aluminum Bottleneck: Coke’s complaint: 12% of Global Stockpile
Held Here, Boosting Prices, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (June 26, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://
www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20110626/FREE/306269994/aluminum.
194. Id.; Industrial and Commercial Metals, 81 Fed. Reg. 96353, 96353 (Dec. 30, 2016)
(to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 7) (responding to the Section 620 Report and a Senate
Subcommittee report, the OCC issued a final rule that said the holding of industrial and
commercial metals like copper or aluminum is not part of or incident to the business of
banking. Since the OCC only regulates national banks and not FHCs, this rule does not affect
the activities described in this Note.)
195. Walsh, supra note 193.
196. Walsh, supra note 193.
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Metro International in February 2010.197 The supply bottleneck in Metro
International’s Detroit warehouses led to record aluminum prices. 198
Though Coca-Cola complained, Prof. Omarova expressed surprise that
more industrial-end aluminum purchasers did not voice complaints about
this market manipulation. 199 Prof. Omarova speculated that “[i]t is also
possible that commercial companies deliberately avoided an open
confrontation with Goldman because it was a Wall Street powerhouse
with which they had—or hoped to establish—important credit and
financial-advisory relationships.”200 Though it would be difficult to
quantify the impact of Goldman Sachs’ credit powers on the behavior of
players in the aluminum market, this incident sheds light on the potential
for abuse when bank entities enter into the commercial realm. 201
Similar to the safety and soundness concerns, the proposed rules
also do not address potential conflicts of interest in lending raised by FHC
involvement in physical commodity transport, storage, and refinement. 202
V. YOU CAN NEVER LEAVE: THE HOTEL CALIFORNIA PROVISION
One complication to the repeal of the Grandfather Provision by
statute—or effective repeal through capital charges—is that such a move
could be perceived as a bait and switch tactic by lawmakers. 203 This is
because of the so-called “Hotel California Provision”204 of Dodd-Frank,
197. Walsh, supra note 193.
198. Walsh, supra note 193.
199. Omarova, supra note 191, at 347 (“It is curious, however, that more industrial end-

users did not publicly complain—or complain a lot sooner or louder—about this potential
conflict-of-interest situation.”).
200. Omarova, supra note 191.
201. Omarova, supra note 191, at 346–47.
202. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Pt.
217 & 225).
203. Bait and Switch, BLACK’S L AW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A sales practice
whereby a merchant advertises a low-priced product to lure customers into the store only to
induce them to buy a higher-priced product. Most states prohibit the bait and switch when
the original product is not actually available as advertised. . . . The unethical practice of
offering an attractive rate or premium to induce a person to apply for a loan or contract, with
approval contingent on some condition, and then telling the person that the offered rate is not
available but that a higher one can be substituted.”).
204. The Eagles, Hotel California (Asylum Records 1976) (“You can check out any time
you like, but you can never leave.”); see also Jacob Goldstein, The ‘Hotel California’ Clause:
Finance Reform Meets Classic Rock, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Mar. 15, 2010, 2:57 PM), http://
www.npr.org/sections/money/2010/03/what_dodds_bill_does_about_too.html (“So what this
part of the bill says is that, even if these institutions get rid of their bank holding companies,
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which stipulates that any firm who was classified as a BHC at the time of
its passage and accepted money from the Troubled Asset Relief Program
would remain under the regulatory supervision of the FRB as a BHC even
if the firm no longer meets the definition of a BHC.205 Morgan Stanley
and Goldman Sachs converted to FHCs in the aftermath of the 2008
financial crisis to gain access to the FRB’s discount window and future
bailout funds.206 Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley made that decision
with an understanding that their commodities dealings would be
grandfathered in by Section 4(o) and would remain permissible under
their new classification as FHCs.207 If the authority to engage in that line
of business was repealed by statute, or regulated to the point of
impracticability, these two firms could claim that the continuation of
these activities was material to their decision to subject themselves to
FRB regulation.208
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the risks and other issues surrounding the activities
permitted to qualifying FHCs by the Grandfather Provision, commodities
industry participants and end-users who responded to the Federal
Reserve’s proposed rule generally support continued FHC involvement
in this field. 209 These commenters point to the increased efficiency and
they’ll still be subject to Fed oversight. Or, to paraphrase the Eagles: Goldman Sachs can
check out any time it likes, but it can never leave.”).
205. 12 U.S.C. § 5327(b) (2016) (“If an entity described in subsection (a) ceases to be a
bank holding company at any time after January 1, 2010, then such entity shall be treated as
a nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors, as if the Council had
made a determination under section 113 [12 USC § 5323] with respect to that entity.”); 12
U.S.C. § 5327(a)(1)(B) (explaining that the previous section applies to any Bank Holding
Company that “received financial assistance under or participated in the Capital Purchase
Program established under the Troubled Asset Relief Program authorized by the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008”).
206. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Board approves, pending
a statutory five-day antitrust waiting period, the applications of Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley to become bank holding companies (Sept. 21, 2008, 9:30 AM) (on file with author)
(announcing the Fed’s approval of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley’s applications to
become BHCs); Michael J. de la Merced et. al., As Goldman and Morgan Shift, A Wall St.
Era Ends, DEALBOOK: N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2008, 9:35 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
/2008/09/21/goldman-morgan-to-become-bank-holding-companies.
207. 12 U.S.C. 1843(o) (2016).
208. Comment letters were due to the Fed by February 20, 2018.
209. Letter from Tom Quaadman, Exec. Vice President, Ctr. for Capital Mkts.
Competitiveness, to Robert Frierson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Jan.
5,
2017)
https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2017/February/20170214/R-1547/R-
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liquidity offered by the sheer size of FHCs as a benefit for market
participants and end-users.210 These benefits are passed on to consumers
in the form of lower prices.211 These commenters suggest that the Federal
Reserve take a closer look at the effect these proposed regulations will
have on the commodities industry more generally before implementing
these new regulations.212
Even if the rule is not adopted, FHCs have been steadily reducing
their footprint in the commodities industry over the past several years.213
Morgan Stanley sold its oil business in 2015 and Goldman Sachs sold its
metal warehousing unit that had been the subject of much criticism. 214
During this same time, employees of these qualifying FHCs who have
commodities expertise have sought greener pastures in non-FHC
commodity trading houses, which can offer traders a greater percentage
of the profits they generate. 215 One analyst described efforts to regulate
bank entity involvement in physical metals as “closing the barn door after
the horse has left,” in response to the reduction in business that took place
even before any rule was passed.216 Though it may be true that FHCs
have been reducing their commodities trading activity, there is no
indication that they intend to cease this activity; indeed, Goldman Sachs’
Chief Executive Officer Lloyd Blankfein has described commodities
trading as a “core” part of his firm’s business. 217 Whether or not Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs continue to make Section 4(o) physical
commodities trading part of their business plan, the Grandfather
Provision is still law and can be used by either of these firms at any
time. 218

1547_010517_131645_521038067193_1.pdf; Letter from Jennifer Fordman, Nat. Gas
Supply Ass’n, to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Dec. 15, 2016).
210. Letter from Jennifer Fordman, Senior Vice President, Nat. Gas Supply Ass’n, to Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Dec. 15, 2016).
211. Letter from Tom Quaadman, supra note 209.
212. Letter from Tom Quaadman, supra note 209, at 3.
213. Jesse Hamilton, Fed Proposes Aggressive Rule on Wall Street Commodity Holdings,
BNA (Sept. 23, 2016, 12:00 PM) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-23/fedproposes-aggressive-rule-on-wall-street-commodity-holdings-itfye706.
214. Hamilton, supra note 213.
215. Alex Nussbaum & Javier Blas, Fed Rules Seen Speeding Commodity Trader Exodus
From Banks, BNA (Sept. 26, 2016).
216. Susanne Barton & Joe Deaux, Wall Street Exit From Physical Metals Formalized
Under OCC Ban, BNA (Dec. 29, 2016).
217. Hamilton, supra note 213.
218. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o) (2016).
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The Financial CHOICE Act is the banking reform bill that has the
most momentum with the current Congress, but does not repeal the
Grandfather Provision and is unlikely to pass in its current form. 219 The
bill has passed the House of Representatives and aims to repeal many of
the regulations imposed by Dodd-Frank.220 Section 152 forbids federal
banking agencies, like the Federal Reserve, from establishing operational
risk capital requirements for banking organizations, unless those
requirements are based on the risks posed by a banking organization’s
current activities and businesses. 221 Neither that section, nor any other
provision of the bill mentions grandfathered commodities activities
explicitly.222 Regardless, that bill is not expected to pass the Senate in its
current form.223 In general, Republican Congressional leaders224 and
President Donald Trump 225 have stressed a desire to cut regulation,
including on financial institutions. 226 Imposing this new regulation
would go against that goal. 227
As for the new Federal Reserve Chairperson Jerome Powell, most
observers do not expect a dramatic change in philosophy from his
predecessor, former Chairperson Janet Yellen.228 Since Yellen was at the

219. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017).
220. Rachel Witkowski & Andrew Ackerman, What’s in the Financial Choice Act?, WALL

ST. J. (June 8, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/whats-in-the-financial-choice-act1496955001.
221. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 152 (2017).
222. Id.
223. Witkowski, supra note 220.
224. Alexander Bolton, The Hill Interview: McConnell: 2017 a Great Year for GOP, THE
HILL (Dec. 19, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/365715-the-hill-interviewmcconnell-2017-a-great-year-for-gop.
225. Eric Lipton & Danielle Ivory, Trump Says His Regulatory Rollback Already is the
Most ‘Far Reaching’, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/us/
politics/trump-federal-regulations.html?mtrref=www.google.com.
226. Ian McKendry, Senate Votes to Repeal CFPB Arbitration Rule in Win for Financial
Institutions, AM. BANKER, Oct. 24, 2017; Rebecca Floyd, Populist Conundrum: Big Banks or
Plaintiffs’ Bar? Banks Win as Congress Overrides the CFPB Rule Banning Class Action
Waivers in Arbitration Agreements, 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 134 (2018).
227. Lydia Wheeler & Lisa Hagen, Trump Signs ‘2-for-1’ Order to Reduce Regulations,
THE HILL (Jan. 30, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/316839-trump-tosign-order-reducing-regulations.
228. Lucinda Shen, Who Is Jerome Powell, Trump’s Pick to Replace Janet Yellen As Fed
Chair?, FORTUNE (Nov. 2, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/01/donald-trump-jeromepowell-fed-federal-reserve-janet-yellen (“For starters, Powell is considered by many to be
close to a continuation of the Yellen era.”).

2018]

FHCs & PHYSICAL COMMODITIES

379

helm for this proposed rule, nothing indicates that Powell will retract it.229
Powell has stated that he believes in strict regulation for the biggest
banks, with lighter regulation for smaller banks. 230 Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs are among the biggest bank holding companies in the
country.231
Ultimately, the Federal Reserve’s proposed capital increases may
make Section 4(o) commodities activities prohibitively expensive and
FHCs will voluntarily abandon those operations.232 Still, the FRB does
not have authority to unilaterally forbid FHCs from engaging in these
activities. 233 Congress should repeal the Grandfather Provision that
allows FHCs to transport, store, distribute, and process or refine physical
commodities.234 Those activities present the greatest potential for
environmental catastrophe and economic liability, thus presenting the
greatest danger to the safety and soundness of the FHC and therefore the
greatest risk to the economy as a whole. 235
PATRICK CONLON*

229. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220, 67225 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. Pt. 217 & 225).
230. Jeff Cox, Fed Nominee Powell: Financial System ‘Quite Strong,’ Backs ‘Tailoring’
Regulations to Ease up on Small Banks, CNBC (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/
11/28/fed-nominee-powell-backs-tailoring-regulations-to-ease-up-on-small-banks.html
(quoting Powell: “We want regulations to be the most intense, the most stringent for the very
largest, most complex institutions and want it to decrease in intensity and stringency as we
move down through the regional banks and the community banks.”).
231. NAT’L INFO. C TR., supra note 181 (listing Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley as the
fifth and sixth largest BHCs in the U.S., respectively).
232. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 143, at 1 (2016).
233. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 28.
234. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 28.
235. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 28.
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